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Non-Technical Summary
The fact that in the 1980s and in the early 1990s wage inequality has increased significantly in the
United States, but hardly, if at all, in Germany, is well-established empirically. Furthermore, there
is convincing empirical evidence that the different experiences of the United States on the one
hand and Germany on the other can be traced back to differences in supply and institutional
factors. As to supply, the rise in wage inequality in the United States has substantially been driven
by increasing returns to skills. Yet higher increases in the relative supply of skilled vs. low-skilled
labour in Germany than in the U.S. have contributed to the ability of Germany to prevent wage
inequality to rise to U.S. levels. As to institutional differences, there is empirical support for the
hypothesis that the system of wage bargaining in Germany has prevented wages of low-skilled
workers to fall to levels that would be justified by supply and demand developments. The existence
of institutional barriers to greater wage dispersion at the lower end of the wage distribution raises
the question of whether these barriers cause unemployment of less skilled workers in Germany.
In order to test the hypothesis that rising unemployment rates of the low-skilled in Europe are
related to the development of wages of this group, I propose an empirical methodology which
makes less restrictive identifying assumptions than some previous related studies. In this paper, a
‘strong wage rigidity dynamic’ is defined as a rising wage rate and a rising unemployment rate in a
labour market (one may also call this case ‘wage push’, as the word ‘rigidity’ often implies that the
wage does not change). A ‘weak wage rigidity dynamic in a decreasing market’ is defined as a
constant wage rate and a rising unemployment rate. The analysis further distinguishes between
rigidities related to average wage developments and those related to the wage structure (i.e.
relative wage developments).
The proposed methodology could serve collective bargaining partners as an information tool in the
form of a ‘wage monitor’. With a large and detailed data set, one can give advice to collective
bargaining partners as to whether (the lack of) recent developments in the wage structure have
been warranted by market forces. Collective bargaining partners may pay special attention to
sections of the labour market where wage behaviour has been identified as having been ‘rigid’ in
the very recent past.
In an application of my methodology to west German individual data from the German Socio-
Economic Panel (GSOEP), I find that the west German wage structure exhibited no ‘strong
rigidities’ between 1992 and 1998. However, ‘weak wage rigidities in a decreasing market’ are
found for the characteristic young and for the characteristic white-collar worker: the ceteris
paribus analysis demonstrates that these groups experienced an increase in the unemployment
likelihood but no change in the wage relative to the ‘average person’. What do my results suggest
for the validity of Krugman’s hypothesis that ‘the European unemployment problem and the U.S.
inequality problem are two sides of the same coin’ (Krugman, 1994, p. 37), namely a fall in the
relative demand for low-skilled workers? Krugman’s hypothesis implies that – in the face of
falling demand – inflexible wages for the low-skilled in Europe have been responsible for rising
unemployment rates for this group. The evidence for western Germany in the 1990s demonstrates
that this is only partly true: considering different dimensions of skill (e.g. age (experience),
education, occupation, and others), I find that there has been no ceteris paribus fall in the relative
demand for low-educated and blue-collar workers in western Germany in the 1990s. Hence, the
comparatively stable wage structure with respect to low educational achievement and blue-collar
occupation seems to have been justified by market forces. Support for Krugman’s hypothesis, on
the other hand, is provided by the finding that the west German wage structure did not respond to a
negative relative demand shock for young workers (who have little labour market experience).
This has led to a ceteris paribus increase in relative unemployment for this group.
Moreover, at a ‘macroeconomic’ level, one observes that average real wages as well as the
average unemployment rate have risen in the 1990s. Thus, average wages have been ‘strongly
rigid’ (as defined in this paper) during the observation period.
Abstract: This paper investigates whether and in what sense the west German wage structure
has been ‘rigid’ in the 1990s. To test the hypothesis that a rigid wage structure has been
responsible for rising low-skilled unemployment, I propose a methodology which makes less
restrictive identifying assumptions than some previous related work.
I find that the relative stability of educational wage premia was justified by market forces.
However, relative wages did not respond to negative net demand shocks for young workers, as
well as white-collar workers.
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11 Introduction
The fact that in the 1980s and in the early 1990s wage inequality has increased significantly in the
United States, but hardly, if at all, in Germany, is well-established empirically (see e.g. Freeman
and Katz, 1995; Nickell and Bell, 1995; 1996; OECD, 1996; Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997; Katz
and Autor, 1999; for international comparisons, and Abraham and Houseman, 1995; Steiner and
Wagner, 1998; Fitzenberger, 1999; and Möller, 1999; for the west German case). Furthermore,
there is convincing empirical evidence that the different experiences of the United States on the
one hand and Germany on the other can be traced back to differences in supply and institutional
factors. As to supply, the rise in wage inequality in the United States has substantially been driven
by increasing returns to skills (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Juhn, Murphy,
and Pierce, 1993; Katz and Autor, 1999). Yet higher increases in the relative supply of skilled vs.
low-skilled labour in Germany than in the U.S. have contributed to the ability of Germany to
prevent wage inequality to rise to U.S. levels (Abraham and Houseman, 1995; Freeman and
Schettkat, 1999). As to institutional differences, there is empirical support for the hypothesis that
the system of wage bargaining in Germany has prevented wages of low-skilled workers to fall to
levels that would be justified by supply and demand developments (Blau and Kahn, 1996; Büttner
and Fitzenberger, 1998; Kahn, 2000).
The existence of institutional barriers to greater wage dispersion at the lower end of the wage
distribution raises the question of whether these barriers cause unemployment of less skilled
workers in Germany (Krugman’s hypothesis, Krugman, 1994, p. 37). According to a simple labour
market model with Marshallian demand and supply schedules, this should indeed be the case.
However, it has to be shown empirically that the German wage structure is responsible for high
unemployment. Econometric evidence on this issue is still rare and a debate on the appropriate
methodology to investigate this topic is missing.
This paper investigates whether and in what sense the west German wage structure has been ‘rigid’
in the 1990s. To test the hypothesis that a rigid wage structure has been responsible for rising low-
skilled unemployment, I propose a methodology which makes less restrictive identifying
assumptions than some previous related work. Furthermore, rather than looking at only two or
three skill groups, different dimensions of skill as well as other factors making labour
heterogeneous are considered. My empirical results on the basis of the German Socio-Economic
Panel show that the stability of the west German wage structure with respect to educational
2attainments was justified by market forces between 1992 and 1998. However, unemployment of
young as well as white-collar workers increased above average, yet the west German wage
structure did not respond to these developments.
The paper is structured as follows. Previous related studies and their methodologies are assessed in
the following Section 2. Section 3 presents a brief theoretical outline and motivates the
assumptions underlying the empirical analysis. Estimation results are presented and discussed in
Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Previous Related Methodologies
Econometric evidence for Germany on the subject of rigidities in the wage structure and their (un-)
employment effects can be divided methodologically into three types of studies which are
summarised in Table 1 and discussed in the following.
First, there is the methodology developed by Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999) which has been
applied to German data by Krueger and Pischke (1997) and in a slightly different version by
Beissinger and Möller (1998). Key identifying assumptions of this approach are that (i) there are
only labour demand, no supply shocks, (ii) the size of a labour demand shock in a given period for
a type of labour (e.g. low-skilled) is linearly related to the wage position of this type of labour at
the beginning of the period, and (iii) the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the own wage
is negative. Given these assumptions (Beissinger and Möller 1998 need only use assumption (ii) of
these), one can correlate initial wages (a proxy for relative demand shocks) with subsequent wage
and employment changes over a population of heterogeneous types of labour. If the German unlike
the U.S. wage structure is rigid with respect to adverse labour demand shocks for low-skilled
labour, one would expect 1) a positive correlation between initial wages and wage changes in the
United States but not so much in Germany, 2) no correlation between initial wage and employment
changes in the United States but a positive one in Germany. The evidence presented by Krueger
and Pischke (1997) concurs with statement 1), but rejects statement 2), because in both the United
States and western Germany, there has been no link between initial wages and relative employment
changes in the 1980s. This would mean that although the west German wage structure did not
change much in the observation period, this did not have implications on the employment structure
and could be justified by market forces. Beissinger and Möller (1998) find the same result for men,
but not for women: there seems to be evidence for a rigidity in the female wage structure which
has negative employment effects.
3The second type of methodology uses the cross-sectional variation of indices of union participation
in wage setting across countries to estimate its effects on relative wages and employment-to-
population ratios of the low-skilled (Kahn, 2000). Key identifying assumptions of this method are
(iii) the elasticity of labour demand with respect to the own wage is negative, (iv) differences in
employment-to-population ratios between countries reflect differences in labour demand, not
supply (as this can only partly be controlled for), (v) there are no unobserved country-specific
factors which influence employment-to-population ratios or wages, and (vi) skill groups as
measured are comparable between countries. If in particular these assumptions are met, 1) an
observed positive correlation between union participation in wage setting and relative wages of the
low-skilled and 2) an observed negative correlation between union participation in wage setting
and relative employment-to-population ratios of the low-skilled can be interpreted as a causal
negative impact of unions on low-skilled employment through excessive wage setting for this
group. Kahn’s (2000) inference is based on estimates with a cross-sectional dimension of 15
countries (including Germany and the United States). It turns out that in a significant number of the
various specifications presented by the author, union participation both raises relative wage and
lowers relative employment-to-population ratios of the low-skilled. Although western Germany is
part of the sample, it is not immediately clear from Kahn’s (2000) work what conclusions one
would draw for the responsibility of German unions for the low employment rates of low-skilled
Germans. The reason is that although union participation is fairly high in Germany as measured by
various indices, it is not possible to infer from the presented results in Kahn (2000) whether
western Germany is a representative observation for the empirical finding or whether is it more of
an outlier.
As a third methodology, elasticities of substitution between skilled and low-skilled labour have
been used to estimate which wage adjustments are necessary to reduce low-skilled unemployment
in western Germany. Key identifying assumptions of this approach are that (vii) there is a stable
relationship between relative wages and relative labour demand in the observation period, (viii)
relative labour supply of different skill groups is constant, and (ix) the estimated elasticity of
substitution between skilled and low-skilled labour is also relevant for a (possibly) out of sample
prediction of relative wage changes. Under assumptions (vii) and (ix), one can calculate for any
desired relative labour demand (employment) change the required relative wage change. If
assumption (viii) is met, the induced employment changes will feed one-to-one into unemployment
changes, because relative wage changes will only have relative demand, but no relative supply
effects. Although there are several studies estimating elasticities of substitution between skilled
4and low-skilled labour in western Germany (e.g. Fitzroy and Funke, 1995; Entorf, 1996; Beissinger
and Möller, 1998; Steiner and Wagner, 1997; Steiner and Mohr, 1998; Möller, 2000; Falk and
Koebel, 2001), only Fitzenberger and Franz (1998; 2000) and Fitzenberger (1999) simulate
required relative wage changes for an equalisation (or change) of unemployment rates of medium-
and low-skilled workers. The estimates suggest a required increase in the wage ratio between these
groups of between 5 and 7 per cent (Fitzenberger, 1999).
Hence, in sum, previous evidence is somewhat inconclusive both with respect to the methodology
which should be applied and the empirical results. The aim in this paper is to investigate whether
there is evidence for the hypothesis that relative wage developments in western Germany in the
1990s can be held responsible for rising low-skilled unemployment. For this to be the case, there
should, for example, have occurred a negative net demand shock for the low skilled combined with
wage setting behaviour which prevented relative wage losses for this group. To take this
hypothesis to the data, my concept of ‘wage rigidity’ is related to the joint observation of wage and
unemployment changes. A wage rate is called ‘rigid’ in this paper if it rises or stays constant, but
unemployment rises simultaneously. This would indicate that the rising or constant wage rate has
contributed to an increasing degree of quantity rationing in the labour market (cf. Maddala, 1983,
Chapter 10).
The question I ask is therefore similar to the one addressed by Krueger and Pischke (1997) and
Beissinger and Möller (1998) using the Card, Kramarz, and Lemieux (1999) methodology.
However, I argue that the hypothesis of ‘wage rigidity’ can be tested with less restrictive
assumptions than the ones imposed in this previous work. In particular, my assumption (a) (see
Section 3.1 and Table 1) is fulfilled if labour demand and supply schedules are ‘downward’ and
‘upward’ sloping, respectively, or, in case the labour supply schedule is backward bending, it must
be less steep than the labour demand schedule and there must be no excess demand for labour.
Assumption (a) can also be fulfilled in other cases, though. Although my assumption (a) and
assumption (iii) implicitly made by Krueger and Pischke (1997) are not strictly nested, most labour
economists would probably find it plausible that both of them are fulfilled. I also assume that (b)
( )( ) ( )( )sgn sgnt tt ttotal rigid wage rateU Uτ τ+ +∆ = ∆ ∀x x x , which means that the sign of the change in the
total unemployment rate is equal to the sign of the change in the unemployment rate due to a rigid
wage rate in all labour markets x  (explained in more detail below). This assumption places
restrictions on the ‘frictional unemployment rate’ which is not allowed to vary the observed
unemployment rate exogenously. A condition similar to my assumption (b) must also be fulfilled
5to agree with the interpretation of the Krueger and Pischke (1997) and Beissinger and Möller
(1998) studies. Beissinger and Möller (1998) must also make my assumption (a) implicitly. So if
both assumptions (iii) and (a) are met, my other key identifying assumptions are less restrictive
than the ones by Krueger and Piscke (1997) and Beissinger and Möller (1998), because my
methodology works without imposing assumptions (i) or (ii).
The assumptions made by Kahn (2000), Fitzenberger and Franz (1998; 2000), Fitzenberger (1999)
and mine are not nested. The cross-country nature of the data used in Kahn (2000) and the
somewhat different question addressed by Fitzenberger and Franz (1998; 2000), and Fitzenberger
(1999) can be expected to require other types of identifying assumptions.
In the following section, I outline the approach taken in this paper in detail.
6Table 1: (Micro-)Econometric Methodologies Applied to Study Wages and (Un-)Employment in Germany
Study Implicit Key Identifying Assumptions Main Data Sets Methodology Key Findings
Krueger and
Pischke
(1997)
(i) There are only labour demand, no supply shocks
(ii) The size of a labour demand shock in a given
period for a type of labour is linearly related to
the wage position of this type of labour at the
beginning of the period
(iii) The elasticity of labour demand with respect to
the own wage is negative
something similar to my assumption (b)
Mikrozensus and
‘Qualification
and Careers
Survey’
1979-1991
Estimation of correlation
between (1) labour
demand shocks and wage
changes and (2) labour
demand shocks and
employment-to
population changes
The inflexibility of the wage structure
had no measurable effects on the
employment structure
Beissinger
and Möller
(1998)
(ii) The size of a labour demand shock in a given
period for a type of labour is linearly related to
the wage position of this type of labour at the
beginning of the period
my assumption (a)
something similar to my assumption (b)
IAB Beschäftig-
tenstichprobe
1980-1990
Estimation of correlation
between (1) labour
demand shocks and wage
changes and (2) labour
demand shocks and
employment rates
(employment divided by
the labour force)
The low flexibility of the male wage
structure had no measurable effects on
the male employment structure
The inflexibility of the female wage
structure had measurable effects on the
female employment structure
Kahn (2000) (iii) The elasticity of labour demand with respect to
the own wage is negative
(iv) Differences in employment-to-population
ratios between countries reflect differences in
labour demand, not supply (as this can only
partly be controlled for)
(v) There are no unobserved country-specific
factors which influence employment-to-
population ratios or wages
(vi) Skill groups as measured are comparable
between countries
‘International
Social Survey
Programme’ data
on 15 OECD
countries
1985-1994
Estimation of correlation
between (1) union
participation in wage
setting and wages of low-
skilled relative to
medium-skilled workers
and between (2) union
participation in wage
setting and employment-
to-population ratios of
low-skilled relative to
medium-skilled workers
Cross-sectional country differences in
union participation show that unions
increase relative wages of the low-
skilled; negative relative employment
effects of unions for this group can only
be found for men
It is not mentioned in the paper in what
way the German data contribute to these
findings
7Table 1: (Micro-)Econometric Methodologies Applied to Study Wages and (Un-)Employment in Germany (ctd.)
Study Implicit Key Identifying Assumptions Main Data Sets Methodology Key Findings
Fitzenberger
and Franz
(1998)
(vii) There is a stable relationship between relative
wages and relative labour demand in the
observation period
(viii) The labour supply ratio of medium- over low-
skilled workers is constant in the observation
period
(ix) The estimated elasticity of substitution is
relevant for a potential out of sample prediction
of relative employment changes
something similar to my assumption (b)
IAB Beschäftig-
tenstichprobe
(males only)
1975-1990
Estimation of elasticity of
substitution between low-
and medium-skilled
workers
To equalise unemployment rates of
medium- and low-skilled workers, the
wage ratio between these groups would
have to grow by 15 per cent
Fitzenberger
(1999)
As in Fitzenberger and Franz (1998) IAB Beschäftig-
tenstichprobe
1975-1990
Similar to Fitzenberger
and Franz (1998)
To equalise unemployment rates of
medium- and low-skilled workers, the
wage ratio between these groups would
have to grow by about 5 to 6.6 per cent
Fitzenberger
and Franz
(2000)
As in Fitzenberger and Franz (1998) IAB Beschäftig-
tenstichprobe
1975-1995
Similar to Fitzenberger
and Franz (1998)
To half unemployment rates of medium-
and low-skilled workers, the wage ratio
between these groups would have to
grow by at most 4 per cent
This study (a) 0W WD S D S× − × <
(b) ( )( ) ( )( )sgn sgnt tt ttotal rigid wage rateU Uτ τ+ +∆ = ∆ ∀x x x
German Socio-
Economic Panel
1992 and 1998
Comparison of wage and
unemployment changes
associated with labour
market characteristics
The west German wage structure has
been ‘weakly rigid’ with respect to
relative unemployment increases of
young workers and males
Notes: D  and S  denote the labour demand and supply functions, respectively. The index W  denotes the derivative with respect to the wage. A
discussion of assumptions (a) and (b) is provided in Section 3.1. It is fulfilled if labour demand and labour supply schedules are ‘downward’ and
‘upward’ sloping, respectively, but also in other cases. Virtually all previous studies must impose something similar to my assumption (b) to make
the interpretation of their results valid. The only potential exception is Kahn’s (2000) study, if the attempt to control for factors influencing market
frictions is successful. My assumption (a) and assumption (iii) implicitly made by Krueger and Pischke (1997) and Khan (2000) are not strictly
nested. However, assumptions (a) and (iii) would probably be accepted as plausible by most labour economists. In this case, my assumptions would
be less restrictive than the ones by Krueger and Piscke (1997) and Beissinger and Möller (1998), as I do not need to make assumptions (i) and (ii).
83 Econometric Considerations
The motivation for my work is to show which information one can retrieve on wage rigidities
under minimal assumptions by merely observing the signs of the wage and unemployment changes
for heterogeneous types of workers. In the model presented in Section 3.1, unemployment changes
are seen as changes in quantity rationing due to inflexible prices (wages) (cf. Maddala, 1983,
Chapter 10). Due to the potential existence of other types of unemployment (termed ‘frictional’
unemployment), I only attempt to identify changes in (rather than levels of) wage rigidities (‘wage
rigidity dynamics’). By using only the information on the change in the wage and unemployment
rate in a labour market between two time periods t  and t τ+ , I do not make any statement on the
‘appropriateness’ of the wage distribution at period t . Thus I am agnostic about whether wages
were too high or too low at time t  and restrict myself to asking whether, for example, there was a
lack of wage rate change in the face of rising unemployment between periods t  and t τ+ . The
information I identify this way can be very useful, though, as it can serve as an information tool for
collective bargaining partners, when undesired unemployment changes have occurred for some
types of labour between times t  and t τ+ .
Identifying whether wages were too high at any time t  would require different assumptions than
the ones I make. For example, one could assume that ‘frictional’ unemployment has the same level
for all types of heterogeneous labour. Under this assumption, wage levels would be too high for all
types of labour experiencing an unemployment rate which is above the pre-specified ‘frictional
rate’. However, such an exercise is not undertaken here.
In my empirical analysis, I will choose a period of low unemployment as time t  and a period of
high unemployment as time t τ+ . This guarantees that I observe a labour market moving into
disequilibrium. It will be interesting to see how this movement into disequilibrium is related to the
wage structure.
The parametric model presented in Section 3.2 identifies ‘contributing factors’ to ‘wage rigidity
dynamics’. These ‘contributing factors’ are characteristics which define heterogeneous types of
labour. Take ‘low level of education’ as an example of such a factor. The econometric analysis
proposed in Section 3.2 allows a statement on whether having a ‘low level of education’ ceteris
paribus increases the chances of operating in a labour market with a ‘wage rigidity dynamic’. In
9other words, my analysis identifies the factors to which wage rigidities are attached. The following
two subsections present a model of the labour market and a possibility for its empirical application.
3.1 Theory and Identification
The framework I impose allows for the fact that labour is heterogeneous. One may think of the
whole labour market of an economy as being composed of a set of specific labour markets defined
by characteristics x  (e.g. age, education, occupation-specific human capital, industry-specific
human capital, region). Borrowing from the supply-demand-institutions framework outlined in
Katz and Autor (1999), I set up the following model of the labour market with heterogeneous
labour:
( ),t t t tL S W R= (vector of labour supplies)
( ),t t t tN D W Z= (vector of labour demands)
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
,
1 1 , , ,rigid wage rate t t t t t t t t t t t t t t tU L N L N L D W Z S W R W Q= − = − = − = Ψ  
(vector of unemployment rates)
( ), , ,,total t t rigid wage rate t frictional tU F U U= (composition of unemployment)
Here, tW  and tU  denote the vectors of wage and unemployment rates (numbers unemployed
according to the International Labour Office (ILO) definition divided by the size of the labour
force) at time t , respectively (each set of labour characteristics x  has an element of tW  and tU
assigned). tS  and tD  are time-varying vector functions, and tR  and tZ  are vectors of ‘shift
factors’ for the supply and demand functions, respectively. The shift factors in the labour supply
function can be migration, changes in the educational structure, or tax changes. In the labour
demand function, shift factors may be technology shocks or migration, for example. The notation
/t tD S  denotes element-by-element division of the two vectors. The vector function tF  relates the
total (observed) unemployment rate to its two components, the unemployment rate due to rigid
wages 
,rigid wage rate tU  and the ‘frictional unemployment rate’ ,frictional tU , which is not modelled here.
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If in the above model there exists a vector of prices (wage rates) *tW  which clears the labour
market, there will be no quantity rationing (unemployment 
,rigid wage rate tU ) if wages are perfectly
flexible. If unemployment 
,rigid wage rate tU  exists in spite of the existence of market clearing wages
*
tW , the reason must be ‘rigid’ wages. Hence this type of unemployment is termed ‘unemployment
due to rigid wages’. Trade union power is often discussed as a possible cause for wage rigidities,
especially in Germany and other European countries (Carlin and Soskice, 1990, Chapter 17;
Nickell, 1997; 1998; Siebert, 1997; Booth, 1995; Blau and Kahn, 1999; Fitzenberger and Franz,
1999; Franz, 1999; Kahn, 2000; Bonin and Zimmermann, 2001). However, other factors such as
public sector pay scales or long-term wage contracts may also cause wages to be rigid.
The above model, unlike all studies mentioned in Section 2 except Kahn (2000), does allow for the
existence of ‘frictional unemployment’. This type of unemployment may exist in reality due to
market frictions like incomplete information or transaction costs. Following the related literature, I
do not model frictional unemployment explicitly, though. For the analysis which follows, the
existence of frictional unemployment can be ignored under the following conditions, which I call
assumption (b):
( )( ) ( )( )sgn sgnt tt ttotal rigid wage rateU Uτ τ+ +∆ = ∆ ∀x x x
where x  are the characteristics defining a labour market such that ( )
,total tU x  is an element of the
vector 
,total tU . Previous studies mentioned in Section 2 except Kahn (2000) do not discuss the
potential implications of the existence of frictional unemployment. However, I argue that in order
to make sense of their results on wages and (un-)employment, they must also assume that changes
in frictional unemployment do not influence their statistical results. This is equivalent to implicitly
imposing something similar to my assumption (b), which states that the sign of the change in the
unemployment rate due to a rigid wage rate is the same as the sign of the change in the total
(observed) unemployment rate. Hence, exogenous changes in the frictional unemployment are
excluded. Of course, it would be preferable to measure frictional unemployment. However,
currently existing data do not allow estimates of frictional unemployment (as defined here) at the
disaggregated level. This is probably why this issue is usually being ignored in the literature.
However, ignoring the topic is equivalent to making some implicit assumption. This is why I
explicitly make the assumption necessary to ignore frictional unemployment.
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I now show that the two key assumptions (a: ( ) ( )
,
, ,t W tD Sτ τ+ +× −x x x x
( ) ( )
,
, , 0t t WD Sτ τ+ +× <x x x x ; explained below, and b: ( )( )sgn tt totalUτ+∆ =x
( )( )sgn tt rigid wage rateUτ+∆ ∀x x )), are sufficient to identify wage rigidity dynamics. This implies
that other methodologies, which make identifying assumptions on (the lack of) changes in labour
supply or demand, put unnecessarily strong restrictions on their data (cf. assumptions (i) and (ii)
mentioned in Section 2).
Using a Taylor expansion of 
,rigid wage rate tU τ+  around ( ),t tW Q  and restricting changes in the
functional form of tΨ  over time by the assumption ( ) ( ), ,t t t t t tW Q W Qτ+Ψ = Ψ  (which still allows
variations in the ‘slopes’ of the labour supply and demand schedules), the change in the
unemployment rate vector due to rigid wages can be written as:
( ) ( )
, ,
, ,
t t t
t rigid wage rate t W t t t t Q t t t
wage effects pure net supply shift effects
U W Q W W Q Qτ τ ττ τ+ + ++ +∆ ≈ Ψ ∆ +Ψ ∆ 
where ( )
,
,t W t tW Qτ+Ψ  and ( ), ,t Q t tW Qτ+Ψ  denote the Jacobian derivatives of t τ+Ψ  at ( ),t tW Q  with
respect to W  and Q , respectively. They shall henceforth be denoted WΨ  and QΨ , respectively.
Assume one distinguishes between NX  different labour markets x . Then, the vectors 
t
t U
τ+∆  etc.
have length NX . Considering the above equation for a specific row element x  of vector 
t
t U
τ+∆ ,
one has:
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,t t t tt rigid wage rate W t W t Q t
own wage effect
cross wage effects pure net supply shift effects
net supply shift effects
U W W Qτ τ τ τ+ + + +
≠
∆ ≈ Ψ ∆ + Ψ ∆ + Ψ ∆∑ ∑
X x X
x x x x x X X x X X

 

    (1)
with
( ), 0WΨ >x x             (2)
due to assumption a) and
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )sgn sgn , , ,t t t tt W t W t Q ttotal
own wage effect
net supply shift effects
U W W Qτ τ τ τ+ + + +
≠
  
∆ = Ψ ∆ + Ψ ∆ + Ψ ∆    
∑ ∑
X x X
x x x x x X X x X X
 
             (3)
because of assumption b).
( )tt Uτ+∆ x , ( )tt Wτ+∆ x , and ( )tt Qτ+∆ x  denote the elements of the respective vectors referring to
labour market x . ( ),WΨ x x  is the diagonal element of matrix WΨ  describing the own-wage
unemployment effect in labour market x . ( ),WΨ x X  is the off-diagonal element of matrix WΨ
describing the cross-wage unemployment effect on labour market x  of a wage change in labour
market X . ( ),QΨ x X  is defined analogously. In Appendix B., equation (1) is illustrated
graphically. Appendix C. discusses this model in relation to the ‘wage curve’ hypothesis.
One can verify that ( ), 0WΨ >x x  if assumption (a):
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
, ,
, , , , 0t W t t t WD S D Sτ τ τ τ+ + + +× − × <x x x x x x x x  is met (due to the quotient rule for
derivatives). As D  and S  are always positive functions, this assumption is fulfilled if
( )
,
, 0t WD τ+ <x x  (‘downward sloping’ demand curve) and ( ), , 0t WS τ+ >x x  (‘upward sloping’
supply curve). However, it is also met if ( )
,
, 0t WD τ+ <x x  and ( ), , 0t WS τ+ <x x  (‘backward bending’
labour supply) if ( ) ( )
, ,
, ,t W t WD Sτ τ+ +<x x x x  (the labour demand is steeper than the labour supply
curve) and ( ) ( ), ,t tD Sτ τ+ +≤x x x x  (there is no excess demand for labour). Other cases when
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assumption (a) is fulfilled can be thought of, but they are probably not so interesting from a labour
economist’s point of view.
From the perspective of agents in labour market x , both the cross-wage effects and the ‘pure’ net
supply shift effects appear as net supply (or net demand) shift effects (this is true irrespective of
whether any two types of labour are gross substitutes or gross complements). For this reason, the
terms ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,t tW t Q tW Qτ τ+ +
≠
Ψ ∆ + Ψ ∆∑ ∑
X x X
x X X x X X  will henceforth together be called net
supply shift effects (if one were to consider cross wage effects separately, further assumptions are
required, as the matrix WΨ  contains ( )1N N −X X  off-diagonal terms whose individual signs are
unknown). A positive (negative) net supply shift effect means that at constant wages, supply
increases (decreases) by more than demand. This can equivalently be called a negative (positive)
net demand shift effect. A market which experiences a negative (positive) demand shift effect is
called a ‘decreasing’ (‘increasing’) market in this paper (see also Appendix B.).
From equations (1) to (3) relating unemployment changes to wage and net supply shift effects, one
may – by observing the signs of wage and unemployment changes in labour market x  on the basis
of assumptions (a) and (b) – draw the following conclusions on the net supply shift effects
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,t tW t Q tW Qτ τ+ +
≠
Ψ ∆ + Ψ ∆∑ ∑
X x X
x X X x X X :
Table 2: Observed Signs of Wage and Unemployment Changes and Implications
Case Observed sign of
( )tt Uτ+∆ x
Observed sign of
( )tt Wτ+∆ x
Implied sign of
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
,
,
t
W t
t
Q t
W
Q
τ
τ
+
≠
+
Ψ ∆ +
Ψ ∆
∑
∑
X x
X
x X X
x X X
(1) + + ?
(2) – – ?
(3) + – +
(4) – + –
(5) + 0 +
(6) – 0 –
(7) 0 + –
(8) 0 – +
(9) 0 0 0
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Note that ( )tt Uτ+∆ x  shall henceforth denote ( )tt totalUτ+∆ x . One knows from the model that a
ceteris paribus increase (decrease) in the wage for a certain type of labour raises (lowers)
unemployment for that type of labour. Thus if changes in the wage and in unemployment rates run
in the same direction (cases (1) and (2) in Table 2), one can say that wage changes have in any case
contributed to the changes in unemployment rates, although one cannot infer anything on the
supply and demand shift factors. I call case (1) a ‘strongly rigid’ and case (2) a ‘converging’ wage
behaviour. An alternative formulation for ‘strongly rigid’ and ‘converging’ may be ‘wage push’
and ‘wage pull’ behaviour, respectively. The ‘strongly rigid’ and ‘converging’ terminology for
cases (1) and (2) is intuitive if the situation at time t  is one of no excess demand for labour. If
wages and unemployment rates run in opposite directions (cases (3) and (4) in Table 2), one knows
whether there has been a positive net supply or a positive net demand effect of changes in the
‘shift’ factors. Furthermore, wage developments do not fully neutralise net supply or net demand
effects in these situations. Cases (3) and (4) are thus termed a ‘weakly adjusting wage in a
decreasing market’ and a ‘weakly adjusting wage in an increasing market’, respectively.
If either wages or unemployment rates do not change (cases (5) to (8)), one can always infer the
sign of the net supply effect of changes in the ‘shift’ factors. I call cases (5) and (6) ‘weakly rigid
wage behaviour in a decreasing’ and ‘increasing market’, respectively. Wages here are ‘rigid’ in
the sense that they do not counteract on the unemployment changes incurred by the net supply shift
effects. Cases (7) and (8) are termed ‘strongly adjusting wage behaviour in a decreasing’ and
‘increasing market’, respectively. In these two situations, wage changes neutralise net supply or net
demand effects. Therefore, this neutralising wage behaviour is termed ‘strongly adjusting’. In case
(9) nothing happens. I call this ‘stable wages in a stable market’.
The following table defines a classification of wage behaviour and labour markets on the basis of
empirical observations of wage and unemployment movements:
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Definition 1: Wage Behaviour and Labour Market Classification
Increasing wage
( ) 0tt Wτ+∆ >x
Constant wage
( ) 0tt Wτ+∆ =x
Decreasing wage
( ) 0tt Wτ+∆ <x
Increasing unemployment
( ) 0tt Uτ+∆ >x
strongly rigid
(wage push)
weakly rigid in
decreasing market
weakly adjusting in
decreasing market
Constant unemployment
( ) 0tt Uτ+∆ =x
strongly adjusting in
increasing market
stable in stable
market
strongly adjusting in
decreasing market
Decreasing unemployment
( ) 0tt Uτ+∆ <x
weakly adjusting in
increasing market
weakly rigid in
increasing market
converging
(wage pull)
The observation of an increase in the wage rate and the unemployment rate in a labour market
between two points in time is, on the basis of my assumptions (a) and (b), defined as a ‘strong
wage rigidity dynamic’. The observation of a constant wage rate and an increase in the
unemployment rate in a labour market between two points in time is defined as a ‘weak wage
rigidity dynamic in a decreasing market’. The two phenomena of a ‘strong wage rigidity dynamic’
and a ‘weak wage rigidity dynamic in a decreasing market’ are particularly interesting for the
purposes this paper, as especially in these cases, ‘rigid’ wage behaviour as defined may be held
responsible for rising unemployment rates. Note that in the case of a ‘weak wage rigidity dynamic
in an increasing market’ wages are ‘rigid’ in the sense that they do not rise and thus they allow
unemployment to fall. This case is not so interesting for my purposes, as I want to test whether
wage increases are responsible for rising unemployment.
The recent literature has focussed much attention on the wage structure by comparing
developments for different skill groups. The analysis of the wage structure is particularly
interesting because it has been hypothesised that wages in Europe (including Germany) are rigid
for low skilled workers (Krugman, 1994). This rigidity in the wage structure is claimed to have
been the main culprit for rising unemployment in European countries like Germany. To test this
hypothesis, one should inspect changes in the wage and unemployment structure separately from
changes in average wage and unemployment rates.
Changes in the wage structure can be characterised by the difference between the wage and
unemployment changes in labour market x  and the changes in a (possibly hypothetical) reference
market x  (which may represent some concept of ‘average’):
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( ) ( )t tt tW Wτ τ+ +∆ − ∆x x
( ) ( )t tt tU Uτ τ+ +∆ − ∆x x
On the basis of the observation of these changes, I can observe and classify relative wage-
unemployment dynamics for the labour market x  (in relation to the reference market x ):
Definition 2: Relative Wage Behaviour and Labour Market Classification
Increasing relative
wage
( )
( ) 0
t
t
t
t
W
W
τ
τ
+
+
∆ −
∆ >
x
x
Constant relative
wage
( )
( ) 0
t
t
t
t
W
W
τ
τ
+
+
∆ −
∆ =
x
x
Decreasing relative
wage
( )
( ) 0
t
t
t
t
W
W
τ
τ
+
+
∆ −
∆ <
x
x
Increasing relative
unemployment
( ) ( ) 0t tt tU Uτ τ+ +∆ − ∆ >x x
strongly rigid
relative to the
reference market
weakly rigid in a
decreasing market
relative to the
reference market
weakly adjusting in
a decreasing market
relative to the
reference market
Constant relative
unemployment
( ) ( ) 0t tt tU Uτ τ+ +∆ − ∆ =x x
strongly adjusting in
an increasing
market
relative to the
reference market
stable in a stable
market
relative to the
reference market
strongly adjusting in
a decreasing market
relative to the
reference market
Decreasing relative
unemployment
( ) ( ) 0t tt tU Uτ τ+ +∆ − ∆ <x x
weakly adjusting in
an increasing
market
relative to the
reference market
weakly rigid in an
increasing market
relative to the
reference market
converging
relative to the
reference market
Hence, the observation of a relative (to the reference market) increase in the wage rate and the
unemployment rate in a labour market between two points in time is defined as a ‘strong relative
wage rigidity dynamic’. The observation of a constant relative wage rate and a relative (to the
reference market) increase in the unemployment rate in a labour market between two points in time
is defined as a ‘weak relative wage rigidity dynamic in a decreasing market’. The two phenomena
of a ‘strong relative wage rigidity dynamic’ and a ‘weak relative wage rigidity dynamic in a
decreasing market’ are particularly interesting for the purposes of the empirical part of the paper.
Note that Definition 2 just ‘shifts the scale’ of Definition 1 by subtracting averages from the wage
and unemployment changes. Definition 1 refers to absolute wage and unemployment changes,
whereas Definition 2 refers to the wage and unemployment changes in relation to the reference
17
market x . Hence, a labour market x  may be classified as strongly rigid in an absolute sense, but
converging in a relative sense if wage and unemployment increases in this market are below the
wage and unemployment increases in the reference market x .
The following section proposes how relative wage-unemployment dynamics may be estimated
empirically with unbalanced panel data (the type of data I use for western Germany).
3.2 Estimation with Unbalanced Panel Data
Realistically, each labour market x  will still show some dispersion in wages and unemployment
likelihoods across workers (i.e. some heterogeneity between workers will be unobserved).
Therefore, it makes sense to talk of expected values of wage rates and unemployment likelihoods
over individuals within market x . Hence I define:
( ) ( )t tW E w≡x x
( ) ( )t tU E u≡x x
where tw  is the hourly wage rate and tu  is a binary variable indicating whether a person is
unemployed at time t . Wage and unemployment dynamics between points in time t  and t τ+  for
labour market x  are defined as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tt t t t tW E w E w E w wτ τ τ+ + +∆ = − = −x x x x
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tt t t t tU E u E u E u uτ τ τ+ + +∆ = − = −x x x x
Relative wage and unemployment dynamics between points in time t  and t τ+  for labour market
x  are defined as:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t tt t t t t tW W E w w E w wτ τ τ τ+ + + +∆ − ∆ = − − −x x x x
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )t tt t t t t tU U E u u E u uτ τ τ τ+ + + +∆ − ∆ = − − −x x x x
The high number of cells defined by all possible realisations of x  and the potentially low number
of observations in these cells make it difficult to estimate ( )t tE w wτ+ − x  and ( )t tE u uτ+ − x  for all
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realisations of x . This dimensionality problem can be reduced by parameterising the conditional
distribution of wages and unemployment. Frequently applied models are:
( ) ( ) { }’ ’ 2ln exp 0.5t t t t tE w E w σ= ⇔ = + ×x   
( ) ( )’t tE u = Φx 
where ( )2 lnt tVar wσ = x  and ( )Φ ⋅  denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal distribution. Hence, I specify a log-linear model for the conditional wage and a probit
model for the conditional unemployment expectations, respectively (see e.g. Mittelhammer, Judge,
and Miller, 2000, Chapter E1, for the expected value of the log-normal distribution). These models
are estimated for the time periods t  and t τ+ . Note that this parameterisation implies that the
effect of any characteristic kx  on the wage and unemployment dynamic is driven by the same
coefficient changes ( ), ,t k t kτβ β+ −  and ( ), ,t k t kτγ γ+ −  in all labour markets. This type of restriction
is in the nature of parametric models.
In Appendix A., it is demonstrated that instead of describing the relative wage and unemployment
dynamics for all possible labour markets x , one can just report the K  dynamics related to the
defining characteristics kx  (where K  is the length of vector x , kx  is an element of x ; in my case,
x  contains only dummy variables). It is shown that there exists a transformation
* * * *
, , , ,
, , ,t k t k t k t kτ τβ β γ γ+ +  of the regression coefficient vectors , , , ,, , ,t k t k t k t kτ τβ β γ γ+ +  for which it is
true that the signs of the coefficient differences ( )* *, ,t k t kτβ β+ −  and ( )* *, ,t k t kτγ γ+ −  for characteristic
kx  equal the signs of the contributions of this characteristic to the relative wage and unemployment
dynamics ( ) ( )t t t tE w w E w wτ τ+ + − − − x x  and ( ) ( )t t t tE u u E u uτ τ+ + − − − x x , respectively. In
other words, if ( )* *, ,t k t kτβ β+ −  is positive, then being in a labour market which has characteristic kx
raises the expected relative wage change ( ) ( )t t t tE w w E w wτ τ+ + − − − x x . Note that due to the
non-linear model specifications, this result is not at all obvious. For example, the statement does
not generally hold for the sign of the differences in the untransformed coefficients ( ), ,t k t kτβ β+ −
and ( ), ,t k t kτγ γ+ −  because of the non-linear nature of the models. The derivation is found in
Appendix A.
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The contribution to relative wage and unemployment behaviour can thus be defined for a labour
market characteristic kx  on the basis of the signs of the coefficient changes ( )* *, ,t k t kτβ β+ −  and
( )* *, ,t k t kτγ γ+ − :
Definition 3: Classification of Contribution of a Labour Market Characteristic kx  to Relative
Wage Behaviour
Contributing to a
relative wage
increase
( )* *, , 0t k t kτβ β+ − >
Contributing to a
constant relative
wage
( )* *, , 0t k t kτβ β+ − =
Contributing to a
relative wage
decrease
( )* *, , 0t k t kτβ β+ − <
Contributing to a
relative unemployment
increase
( )* *, , 0t k t kτγ γ+ − >
contributing to a
strong relative wage
rigidity dynamic
contributing to a
weak relative wage
rigidity dynamic in a
decreasing market
contributing to a
weak relative wage
adjustment dynamic
in a decreasing
market
Contributing to a
constant relative
unemployment
( )* *, , 0t k t kτγ γ+ − =
contributing to a
strong relative wage
adjustment dynamic
in an increasing
market
contributing to a
relatively stable
market
contributing to a
strong relative wage
adjustment dynamic
in a decreasing
market
Contributing to a
relative unemployment
decrease
( )* *, , 0t k t kτγ γ+ − <
contributing to a
weak relative wage
adjustment dynamic
in an increasing
market
contributing to a
weak relative wage
rigidity dynamic in
an increasing
market
contributing to a
relative wage
convergence
dynamic
In analogy to the definitions above, the two phenomena of a ‘contribution to a strong relative wage
rigidity dynamic’ and a ‘contribution to a weak relative wage rigidity dynamic in a decreasing
market’ are particularly interesting for the purposes of the empirical part of the paper.
If two independently-drawn cross sections of data were available for the same population, one
could estimate the coefficient vectors *
,t kβ , * ,t kτβ + , *,t kγ  and * ,t kτγ +  in four separate regressions
(wage regressions for *
,t kβ , * ,t kτβ +  and probit regressions for *,t kγ , * ,t kτγ + ). It may be justifiable to
assume that the four estimates are independent in this case. However, with unbalanced panel data
with random entry and attrition (assumptions which I make), one may obtain efficiency gains by
estimating joint wage as well as joint unemployment regressions for the two points in time t  and
t τ+ . Thus I estimate an unbalanced panel equivalent to a seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR)
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model for the wage regressions. For the unemployment regressions, I estimate the probit equivalent
to a SUR model for unbalanced panel data. As Monte-Carlo evidence suggests that the attempt to
correct for sample selection in wage regressions may be futile if adequate instruments are not
available, I do not correct for sample selection (see e.g. Leung and Yu, 1996, for a Monte Carlo
study or Puhani, 2000a, for a survey of such Monte-Carlo studies). In the following, I present the
econometric models which are implemented in this study:
The model for the (reduced–form) wage regressions is
, , ,
, , ,
ln
ln
t i t i t t i
t i t i t t i
w
w τ τ τ τ
ε
ε+ + + +
= +
= +
x
x
   with   
, ,
, ,
0
0
t i t i
t i t i
E
E τ τ
ε
ε + +
  = 
  = 
x
x
Observations i  are assumed to be independent drawings. Furthermore, I assume random entry and
attrition with indicator WR  which takes on realisation , , 1w t ir =  if person i  is in the wage regression
sample at time t  (and 0  otherwise). The likelihood function to be maximised is:
( )2 2 ,, , , , , ,t t t t W N N W Nτ τσ σ ρ+ + =  
( )
, , , ,
2 2 2
1
, , , ,ln ln
, ,
N
t i t i t t i t i t
W
i t t
w t i w t ir r
w w τ τ τ
τ
τ
φ ρ
σ σ
+ + +
= +
+
− −   ∏
x 
( )
( )
( )
( )
, , , ,
1 12 2
, , , , , , , ,
1 1ln lnt i t i t t i t i t
t t
w t i w t i w t i w t ir r r r
w w τ τ τ
τ
τ τ
φ φ
σ σ
+ + +
+
+ +− −
− −   
× ×      
x 
with ( )
,W t t t tτ τρ σ σ σ+ + =   . ( ) ( )1φ ⋅  and ( ) ( )2φ ⋅  denote the standard normal and standardised
bivariate normal density functions, respectively (see also Greene, 2000, p. 849; Poirier, 1995, p.
121). N  is the number of observed individuals. Maximising this likelihood function will yield
consistent and efficient estimates if the error terms have a multivariate normal distribution:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
’
,
, , , , , , 2
,
, 0, ; , , t t tt i t i W W t i t i t i t i
t t t
N E iττ τ τ
τ τ
σ σ
ε ε ε ε ε ε
σ σ
+
+ + +
+ +
  Σ Σ = = ∀    

However, maximum likelihood estimation are still consistent (but not efficient) if this is not the
case, as long as the distribution of the error terms belongs to the quadratic exponential family
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(Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon, 1984). However, maximum likelihood estimates of standard
errors based on the inverse Hessian are inconsistent. Therefore, I estimate robust standard errors.
The model for the (reduced–form) unemployment regressions is:
( )
( )
, , , , ,
, , , , ,
; 1 0
; 1 0
t i t i t t i t i t i
t i t i t t i t i t i
u u u
u u uτ τ τ τ τ τ
η
η+ + + + + +
= + = >
= + = >
x
x
 
 
   with   
, ,
, ,
0
0
t i t i
t i t i
E
E τ τ
η
η + +
  = 
  = 
x
x
 and
( ) ( ) ( )( )’, , , , , , 1, 0, ; , , 1Ut i t i U U t i t i t i t i UN E iτ τ τ
ρη η η η η η ρ+ + +
  Σ Σ = = ∀    

Here I make the assumption of joint normality of the errors, as no pseudo maximum likelihood
estimator exists, to my knowledge, in case it is violated. Under the assumptions of independent
drawings and random entry and attrition, the likelihood function is
( ),, , , ,t t U N N U Nτ ρ+ =  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
. . . , . ,2
1
. . , ,1 1
, , , ,
, . , ,, . , ,
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2 1 , 2 1 , 2 1 2 1
2 1 2 1
N
t i t i t t i t i t t i t i U
i
t i t i t t i t i t
u t i u t i
u t i u t iu t i u t i
r r
r rr r
u u u u
u u
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ
τ
ττ
ρ+ + + +
=
+ + +
+
++ −−
 Φ − − − − × 
 Φ − ×Φ −    
∏ x 
x 
( ) ( )1Φ ⋅  and ( ) ( )2Φ ⋅  denote the standard normal and standardised bivariate normal cumulative
density functions, respectively (see also Greene, 2000, p. 849; Poirier, 1995, p. 121). Note that u
is the binary dependent variable (unemployed) here, not an error term. I maximise the just
presented likelihood functions using the econometric software stata 6.0.
In the following section, the methodology I propose is applied to west German data from 1992 and
1998.
4 Empirical Application: Western Germany
4.1 Data
In order to test whether rising unemployment has been mainly related to rigidities in the west
German wage structure, one would like to observe micro-level data on wages and unemployment
for a period of rising average unemployment. (Note that this is not sampling on the endogenous
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outcome, as the endogenous outcome is the joint behaviour of unemployment and wages). For
western Germany in the 1990s, the comparison of the years 1992 (where unemployment has been
low) and 1997/1998 (up to where unemployment rose) seems appropriate for the current purpose.
The analysis of wage and unemployment structures proposed in this paper requires representative
individual data files for western Germany with information both on wages and unemployment. The
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), the Microcensus (Mikrozensus), and the IABS are
potential candidates. Although the Microcensus has a high number of observations as an important
advantage over the GSOEP, it has unfortunately not been carried out in 1992. It is also not possible
to work with this data set outside Germany. Furthermore, the wage information is only given in
intervals. The IABS data file is also attractive due to its large sample size, but unemployment is
measured as registered unemployment (whereas unemployment according to the ILO definition,
see below, seems more appropriate). Moreover, wages are censored above the social security
threshold level in the IABS. For these reasons, I choose to carry out the analysis with GSOEP data
(detail on the GSOEP can be obtained from the internet page: http://www.diw-
berlin.de/english/sop/index.html).
For reasons mentioned in the above paragraph, the 1992 and 1998 waves are picked for the
econometric analysis. The sample selection criteria are described in Table A1 in Appendix D.
Unemployment rates (both average and by socio-economic characteristic) are reported for the years
1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998 for the (unweighted) samples in Table A2 in Appendix D. As
explained in a footnote to the table, GSOEP data suggest that the peak in west German
unemployment was in 1998 and not in 1997 (as official data suggest). Hence my choice of 1998 as
the end of the investigated period.
In the sample, only people aged between 16 and 65 are included. The labour market defining
characteristics x  used for estimation are reported together with their sample means in Table A3 of
Appendix D. I use the variables age, education, gender, occupation, industry, sector of
employment (public/private), and Bundesland (region) and code them as dummy variable groups.
Variables carrying a ‘skill’ dimension which may be ordered are age, education, and occupation.
Thus, I distinguish between different dimensions of skill. The dependent variable in the wage
regressions is the natural logarithm of the real hourly wage rate (measured in 1998 Deutsche
Marks). In the unemployment equations, the dependent variable is equal to 1  if a person is
unemployed and 0  if employed (non-participants in the labour market are irrelevant in this study).
Unemployment is defined very similar to the standard of the International Labour Office (ILO).
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The ILO criteria for being unemployed are that somebody is not working in the reference week, is
looking for a job, and is ready to take up a job in the very short term. The GSOEP has information
on whether a person is working and whether he or she is ready to take up an offered job very soon.
The difference to the ILO criteria is that the GSOEP asks whether somebody ‘definitely plans to
work in the future’, but not whether somebody is ‘now looking for work’. However, the definition
of unemployment used here is still very close to the one used by the ILO. The variables industry,
occupation, and sector of employment (public/private) are proxies for human capital which
somebody supplies to the labour market. As the ‘current’ values of these variables are potentially
endogenous to both the wage and the unemployment equations (as set up in Section 3.2 above), I
use the characteristics stated in the most recent of the previous three GSOEP waves (i.e. the
previous three years) as a proxy for industry etc. specific human capital. As the number of
unemployed people in the samples is 228 and 350 in the 1992 and 1998 waves, respectively, a
rough coding of industry and occupation categories is necessary to allow precise estimates. For the
same reason, I do not split the sample according to gender. As too few unemployed managers and
farmers are in the sample, I exclude these groups from the estimation. As the GSOEP is made up
of certain subsamples whose relative weights are changing over time, I control for these changing
weights by including dummy variables indicating the subsample. These dummy variables are only
included for this purpose and are not interpreted as labour market defining characteristics (their
coefficients are available from the author upon request). Empirical results are presented in the
following subsection.
4.2 Empirical Results
The estimated vectors ( )* *ˆ ˆt tτ+ −  and ( )* *ˆ ˆt tτ+ −  are reported together with appropriate t -statistics
in Table 3. Inference is based on separate t -tests on the coefficient changes ( )* *ˆ ˆt tτ+ −  and
( )* *ˆ ˆt tτ+ − . Sizes of 5 per cent of these t -tests correspond to a level of 10 per cent (which is the
upper bound of the true size, the lower bound being 5 per cent) of the Bonferroni joint test of the
null hypothesis ( ) ( )* * * *, , , ,ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0t k t k t k t kτ τβ β γ γ+ +− = − =  (see e.g. Mittelhammer, Judge, and Miller, 2000,
p. 73 f.). As I do not want the level of the joint test to exceed 10 per cent, I only consider 5 per cent
critical values for the t -statistics.
The transferred coefficients on the constant referring to the 1992 sample mean tx  (which is chosen
as the reference x  for both periods t  and t τ+ ) show that ‘on average’, the likelihood of being
24
unemployed increased significantly between 1992 and 1998. Also real wages increased
significantly on average. Hence, there has been a ‘strong wage rigidity dynamic’ (as defined in
Section 3) between 1992 and 1998 attached to the wage of the ‘average’ (1992) worker in western
Germany.
The main focus of this study, however, is on the wage structure, i.e. on relative wage and
unemployment changes. It is of particular interest whether potentially rising relative
unemployment of low-skilled workers can be traced back to a rise in the relative wage of this
group. To this end, the coefficient changes  ( )* *ˆ ˆt tτ+ −  and ( )* *ˆ ˆt tτ+ −  have to be observed for the
labour market defining characteristics x  (see also the methodological discussion in Section 3 and
Appendix A.).
Table 3 reveals that western Germany has seen few changes in both the wage and unemployment
structures between 1992 and 1998. (The reader interested in the estimated wage and
unemployment differentials in the years 1992 and 1998 is referred to Tables A4 and A5 in
Appendix D., respectively). The only significant changes at the 5 per cent level in the wage
structure are observed for the categories professional occupation, a group which could increase its
positive wage differential further with respect to the mean, and higher education (between 15 and
20 years of education), for which there was a fall in the wage premium. At the 10 per cent
significance level, one observes a decrease in the relative wage position of white-collar workers.
The result that the west German wage structure has been relatively stagnant is not that surprising.
Previous papers have reached similar conclusions for the 1980s and early 1990s (Abraham and
Houseman, 1995; Freeman and Katz, 1995; Nickell and Bell, 1996; OECD, 1996; Krueger and
Pischke, 1997; Steiner and Wagner, 1998; Freeman and Schettkat, 1999; 2000; Katz and Autor,
1999). There is also other evidence based on GSOEP data on the stable or declining higher–
education wage premium over the late 1980s and early to mid 1990s (Boockmann and Steiner,
2000; Lauer and Steiner, 2000). Other studies on western Germany using a large data set on
individual earnings (IABS) find that there have been some changes in the wage structure in the
1980s and early 1990s, but the view that there have only been small alterations compared to the
developments in the United States is not challenged (Fitzenberger and Franz, 1998; Fitzenberger
1999; Möller, 1999). In the United States, by contrast, educational and skill premia have risen
substantially during that period (Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992; Juhn,
Murphy, and Pierce, 1993; Katz and Autor, 1999).
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Having established that the west German wage structure has been fairly stagnant between 1992 and
1998, the question arises whether this has had implications on the unemployment structure. It is a
contribution of this paper to systematically compare ceteris paribus changes in the wage structure
with changes in the unemployment structure on the basis of the methodology developed in Section
3. As Table 3 shows, there were few, but some, changes in the unemployment structure. Groups
whose relative unemployment likelihood increased during the observation period are young people
aged between 16 and 25, white-collar workers, and males (the change for the latter is only
significant at the 10 per cent level). Groups whose relative unemployment likelihood decreased are
workers aged between 46 and 55, females, and workers with no previous employment in the
occupation dummy variable group (all significant only at the 10 per cent level).
Applying Definition 3 (see Section 3.2), the labour market characteristics x  (which are the
regressors of the wage and unemployment models) can be classified according to their contribution
to relative wage behaviour. This classification is shown in Table 4 (for reasons stated below the
table, only coefficient changes individually significant at the 5 per cent level are inferred as being
unequal to zero). The west German wage structure exhibited no characteristic ‘contributing to a
strong relative wage rigidity dynamic’. However, being young (aged 16 to 25 years) or a white-
collar worker ‘contributed to a weak relative wage rigidity dynamic in a decreasing market’: the
relative unemployment likelihood for these groups fell and relative wages remained stable (ceteris
paribus). One may thus conclude that for these groups, a lack in the downward flexibility of the
wage rate contributed to rising unemployment. The characteristics young age and white-collar
occupation are attached to 12 and 41 per cent of the 1998 labour force sample, respectively (see
Table A3 in Appendix D.). This finding thus carries some significance for the judgement of the
rigidity of the west German wage structure as a whole. As to the rising youth unemployment
problem in Germany, it is also documented in Zimmermann (2000). Although wages for young
workers are already relatively low, labour plus other costs incurred by employers in the German
vocational education system may still be too high to ‘clear’ the labour market. Young workers
seem to have paid a price in terms of higher unemployment for the fact that the west German wage
structure did not allow returns to age (experience) to increase. It is well documented that returns to
experience increased in the United States in the 1980s and early 1990s (Katz and Murphy, 1992;
Murphy and Welch, 1992; Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce, 1993; Freeman and Katz, 1995; Katz and
Autor, 1999). A slight surprise may be the finding that the characteristic white-collar worker
‘contributed to a weak relative wage rigidity dynamic’ in the observation period. It was this group,
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not blue-collar workers, which was hit by a negative relative net demand shock during the
observation period.
It is interesting to observe that a falling higher education (between 15 and 20 years of education)
wage premium is not associated with any changes in the educational unemployment structure. This
partly supports evidence from Krueger and Pischke (1997) that the stagnant wage structure did not
cause unemployment in western Germany. The result for professional workers (‘increasing
market’) is probably not surprising.
To sum up, apart from an increase in both the average wage and unemployment rate between 1992
and 1998, I find some evidence for rigidities in the west German wage structure. These rigidities
are related to the returns on young age and white-collar occupation. However, they are not related
to the returns to education. In particular, there have been no changes in the unemployment
likelihoods between different educational groups and there has also been no relative increase in the
unemployment incidence of blue-collar workers. Instead, white-collar workers were increasingly
hit by unemployment in western Germany in the 1990s. These findings qualify Krugman’s
hypothesis that rising unemployment in Europe (especially for the low-skilled) and increasing
wage dispersion in the United states are ‘two sides of the same coin’ (Krugman, 1994, p. 37),
namely a fall in the relative demand for low-skilled labour. Whereas the differences in the wage
experiences between the United States and western Germany are well documented empirically, I
have shown that western Germany has – contrary to what might have been presumed – not seen an
increase in relative unemployment of less educated workers once one controls for other individual
characteristics relevant for labour market outcomes. My econometric (ceteris paribus) results thus
substantiate Nickell and Bell’s (1995; 1996) argument that the relative unemployment rates of the
less educated did not rise in western Germany in the 1980s and early 1990s. An explanation for
this finding may be found in empirical evidence on test scores of German and U.S. American
citizens. It reveals that the ‘low-skilled’ German labour force is significantly better educated than
the ‘low-skilled’ American one: this could be the reason why relative earnings of ‘low-skilled’
German workers did not have to fall in order to prevent relative unemployment rises for this group
(Nickell and Bell, 1996; Freeman and Schettkat 1999; 2000).
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Table 3: Ceteris Paribus Wage and Unemployment Changes
Wage Regressions Unemployment Regressions
( )* *ˆ ˆt tτ+ − t -value ( )* *ˆ ˆt tτ+ − t -value
1992 Sample Mean 0.041** 3.35 0.344** 5.09
Age in years
16-25 0.027 0.70 0.327** 3.25
26-35 -0.008 -0.46 -0.093 -1.27
36-45 0.015 1.02 0.055 0.66
46-55 -0.021 -1.25 -0.165* -1.72
56-65 -0.023 -0.72 -0.113 -0.66
Education in years
0-8 -0.021 -0.68 -0.046 -0.33
9 -0.008 -0.29 0.105 0.89
10-11 0.005 0.62 0.003 0.06
12-13 0.030 1.35 -0.142 -1.19
14 0.042 1.16 -0.036 -0.14
15-20 -0.052** -1.96 0.078 0.44
Gender
male 0.003 0.43 0.079* 1.85
female -0.005 -0.43 -0.111* -1.85
Occupation
professional 0.053** 2.29 -0.204 -1.22
white-collar -0.023* -1.75 0.199** 2.25
blue-collar -0.007 -0.53 -0.057 -0.70
no previous employment 0.115 1.40 -0.366* -1.85
Industry
industry -0.017 -1.32 0.043 0.54
services 0.014 1.13 -0.026 -0.37
no previous employment 0.045 0.55 -0.119 -0.56
Sector of Employment
public sector 0.002 0.13 0.024 0.19
private sector -0.004 -0.68 0.005 0.14
no previous employment 0.065 0.78 -0.138 -0.65
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Table 3: Ceteris Paribus Wage and Unemployment Changes (ctd.)
Wage Regressions Unemployment Regressions
( )* *ˆ ˆt tτ+ − t -value ( )* *ˆ ˆt tτ+ − t -value
Bundesland
Schleswig-Holstein or
Hamburg
-0.012 -0.33 -0.338 -1.49
Niedersachsen or Bremen 0.011 0.47 -0.159 -1.29
Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.005 0.42 0.104 1.47
Hessen -0.016 -0.63 0.045 0.32
Rheinland-Pfalz or
Saarland
0.000 -0.01 -0.015 -0.08
Baden-Württemberg -0.001 -0.04 -0.082 -0.88
Bayern -0.001 -0.06 0.092 0.89
Observations 5,566 7,288
ln likelihood -6,276.32 -1,762.24
; ;t t Wτσ σ ρ+  or Uρ 0.626; 0.614; 0.752 0.231
Notes: Coefficient changes marked with two (one) asterisk(s) are significant at the 5 (10) per cent
level.
The occupation, industry, and sector of employment variables are taken from the most recently
available of the corresponding three previous waves. People with no previous employment
conceptually build an extra category for each of these three dummy variable groups. Hence this
variable is reported three times here, although it only appears once in the estimation.
Because of the specific sampling procedure of the GSOEP, dummy variables were added to control
for the changing subsample (A, B, C, D) weights; original estimation output is available from the
author upon request.
Both Wρ  and Uρ  are significantly different from zero.
Source: GSOEP; own calculations.
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Table 4: Classification of Contribution of Labour Market Characteristics to Relative Wage
Behaviour According to Definition 3
Contributing to a
relative wage
increase
( )* *, , 0t k t kτβ β+ − >
Contributing to a
constant relative
wage
( )* *, , 0t k t kτβ β+ − =
Contributing to a
relative wage
decrease
( )* *, , 0t k t kτβ β+ − <
Contributing to a
relative unemployment
increase
( )* *, , 0t k t kτγ γ+ − >
contributing to a
strong relative wage
rigidity dynamic:
contributing to a
weak relative wage
rigidity dynamic in a
decreasing market:
contributing to a
weak relative wage
adjustment dynamic
in a decreasing
market:
none
- age: 16-25 years
- occupation:
white-collar
none
Contributing to a
constant relative
unemployment
( )* *, , 0t k t kτγ γ+ − =
contributing to a
strong relative wage
adjustment dynamic
in an increasing
market:
contributing to a
relatively stable
market:
contributing to a
strong relative wage
adjustment dynamic
in a decreasing
market:
- occupation:
professional
- all not otherwise
mentioned
characteristics
- education:
15-20 years
Contributing to a
relative unemployment
decrease
( )* *, , 0t k t kτγ γ+ − <
contributing to a
weak relative wage
adjustment dynamic
in an increasing
market:
contributing to a
weak relative wage
rigidity dynamic in
an increasing
market:
contributing to a
relative wage
convergence
dynamic:
none none none
Note: Classifications are undertaken on the basis of separate t -tests with a size of 5 per cent, which
corresponds to a level of 10 per cent (which is the upper bound of the true size) of the Bonferroni
joint test (see e.g. Mittelhammer, Judge, and Miller, 2000, p. 73 f.).
Source: GSOEP; own calculations.
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5 Conclusions
This paper has investigated whether and in which sense the west German wage structure has been
‘rigid’ in the 1990s. A ‘strong wage rigidity dynamic’ (‘wage push’) is defined as a rising wage
rate and a rising unemployment rate in a labour market. A ‘weak wage rigidity dynamic in a
decreasing market’ is defined as a constant wage rate and a rising unemployment rate in a labour
market. The analysis further distinguishes between rigidities related to average wage developments
and those related to the wage structure.
In order to test the popular hypothesis that rising unemployment rates in Europe are related to
rigidities of the wage structure (Krugman 1994), I propose a methodology which makes less
restrictive identifying assumptions than some previous studies about changes in labour demand and
labour supply. Different dimensions of skill are distinguished, like age (experience), education,
occupation, and other labour market characteristics which may make labour heterogeneous.
The empirical analysis shows that the west German wage structure exhibited no ‘strong relative
rigidities’ between 1992 and 1998. However, ‘weak relative rigidities’ are found for the
characteristics young age and white-collar worker: the ceteris paribus analysis demonstrates that
these groups experienced an increase in the unemployment likelihood but no change in the wage
relative to the ‘average person’. What do my results suggest for the validity of Krugman’s
hypothesis that ‘the European unemployment problem and the U.S. inequality problem are two
sides of the same coin’ (Krugman, 1994, p. 37), namely a fall in the relative demand for low-
skilled workers? Krugman’s hypothesis implies that – in the face of falling demand – inflexible
wages for the low-skilled in Europe have been responsible for rising unemployment rates for this
group. The evidence for western Germany in the 1990s demonstrates that this is only partly true:
considering different dimensions of skill (e.g. age (experience), education, occupation, and others),
I find that there has been no ceteris paribus fall in the relative demand for low-educated and blue-
collar workers in western Germany in the 1990s. Hence, the comparatively stable wage structure
with respect to low educational achievement and blue-collar occupation seems to have been
justified by market forces. Support for Krugman’s hypothesis, on the other hand, is provided by the
finding that the west German wage structure did not respond to a negative relative demand shock
for young workers (who have little labour market experience). This has led to a ceteris paribus
increase in relative unemployment for this group.
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Moreover, at a ‘macroeconomic’ level, one observes that average real wages as well as the
average unemployment rate have risen in the 1990s. Thus, average wages have been ‘strongly
rigid’ (as defined in this paper) during the observation period.
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Appendix
A. Coefficient Transformation and Interpretation
Transformation of the Dummy Variable Coefficients
This section is largely a reproduction and partly an adaptation of material in Puhani (2000b).
Adapting the suggestion by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997), the transformation of regression
coefficients t  and t  (which include zeros for base categories of dummy variables and indicate
the ceteris paribus deviation of the dependent variable when in the corresponding rather than the
base category) to coefficients *t  and *t , which indicate the corresponding deviation from the
category mean x , is undertaken in the following way (including corresponding variance-
covariance matrices):
( )*t t= −  ; ( )*t t= − 
( ) ( ) ( )( )’*t tV V= − −    ; ( ) ( ) ( )( )’* ttV V= − −   
with I  the identity matrix and
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1 1
l
ld
D
d w lβ= = ∀∑
where l  denotes the type of dummy variable group (e.g. age) for which lD  different (e.g. age)
categories exist. The bold 0 s in W  refer to matrices containing only zeros. Note that in some
cases displayed above, the 0 s must be row vectors.
As defined, the first element of the *t  vector has to be the coefficient of the constant. For the
weight 
ld
wβ  I choose the sample share of observations in category d  within the dummy variable
group l  at time t , i.e. 
, ,ld l d tw xβ = . The matrix −I W  thus transforms the coefficient of the
constant to the expected value of the (underlying) dependent variable for the reference market,
( )E ⋅ x , which may be seen as an approximation of the sample mean of the (underlying) dependent
variable. The elements of the thus defined coefficient vector *t  satisfy
*
, ,1 0 ,
l
ld
D
l d td w l tβ β= = ∀∑ .
*
t  is defined analogously. I use the means of the 1992 wave , ,l d tx  for both the transformations in
1992 ( )t  and 1998 ( )t τ+  as weights 
ld
wβ , because constant weights need to be chosen to identify
wage and unemployment dynamics for a labour market relative to a constant reference level (which
is tx  in this case).
As mentioned in Section 3.2 and outlined in this Appendix below, I am interested in the changes of
the transformed coefficients, i.e.:
( )* *t tτ+ − ; ( )* *t tτ+ −
with variance-covariance matrices
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )’* * * * * * * *, ,t t t t t t t tV V V Cov Covτ τ τ τ+ + + +− = + − −
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )’* * * * * * * *, ,t t t t t t t tV V V Cov Covτ τ τ τ+ + + +− = + − −
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where the covariance matrices ( )* *,t tCov τ+  and ( )* *,t tCov τ+  can be retrieved from the SUR-
type maximum likelihood estimates described in Section 3.2. Note that ( )* *,t tCov τ+  and
( )* *,t tCov τ+  are not standard variance-covariance matrices, but symmetric matrices containing
the covariances of the elements of the vectors * *,t t τ+  and 
* *
,t t τ+ , respectively. The elements on
the diagonals, for example, are ( )* *, ,,t k t kCov τβ β +  and ( )* *, ,,t k t kCov τγ γ + , respectively. Estimation
results are presented and discussed in Section 4.2.
Interpretation of the Transformed Coefficients
The following parameterisations shall be given:
( ) ( ) { }’ ’ 2ln exp 0.5t t t t tE w E w σ= ⇔ = + ×x   
( ) ( )’t tE u = Φx 
where ( )2 lnt tVar wσ = x , and ( )Φ ⋅  denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard
normal distribution (see e.g. Mittelhammer, Judge, and Miller, 2000, Chapter E1, for the expected
value of the log-normal distribution). ( ) { }’ 2exp 0.5E wτ τ τσ= + ×x   and ( ) ( )’E uτ τ= Φx   can
be approximated by a first-order Taylor expansion around ( )2,t tσ  and ( )t , respectively.
Relative wage and unemployment dynamics ( ) ( )t t t tE w w E w wτ τ+ + − − − x x  and
( ) ( )t t t tE u u E u uτ τ+ + − − − x x  can then be expressed as follows (see also Yun, 2000, for the
probit case):
( ) ( )t t t tE w w E w wτ τ+ +− − − ≈x x
{ } { }
{ } { }
’ 2 ’ 2
2 2 ’ 2 ’ 2
’ exp 0.5 exp 0.5
0.5 exp 0.5 exp 0.5
t t t t t t
t t t t t t
τ
τ
σ σ
σ σ σ σ
+
+
     
     
− + × − + × +
× − + × − + ×
   
 
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( ) ( )t t t tE u u E u uτ τ+ +− − − ≈x x
[ ] ( ) ( )’ ’’t t t tτ φ φ+  − −    
Writing in terms of sums instead of matrix notation one gets
( ) ( )t t t tE w w E w wτ τ+ +− − − ≈x x
{ } { }
{ } { }
’ 2 ’ 2
, ,
2 2 ’ 2 ’ 2
exp 0.5 exp 0.5
0.5 exp 0.5 exp 0.5
t k t k k t t k t t
k
t t t t t t
x xτ
τ
β β σ σ
σ σ σ σ
+
+
  − + × − + × +   
  × − + × − + ×   
∑  
 
( ) ( )t t t tE u u E u uτ τ+ +− − − ≈x x
( ) ( )’ ’, ,t k t k k t k t
k
x xτγ γ φ φ+   − −   ∑  
where k  denotes an element of the , , or x  vectors. In my case, there are only dummy variables
contained in x . Assume that one has L  different sets of dummy variables each of which contains
lD  categories. The standard estimation procedure is to set the coefficient of one category (the base
category) to zero. A specific coefficient then states the deviation of the expected value of the
dependent variable of the respective category from the one of the base category. An alternative to
this procedure is to present coefficients for each category such that they fulfil
*
, , , ,1 0
lD
l d t l d td x lβ= = ∀∑  and *, , , ,1 0lD l d t l d td x lτβ += = ∀∑  (see Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt, 1997,
and this Appendix above). This presentation contains exactly the same information, but the
transformed coefficients *
, ,l d tβ  and *, ,l d t τβ +  now state the deviation of the expected value of the
dependent variable of the respective category from a hypothetical reference x  which in my case
takes on the value of the mean at time t , t=x x , for all categories of the respective dummy
variable set. The *
, ,l d tγ  and *, ,l d t τγ +  coefficients are obtained analogously. One can thus write
( ) ( )t t t tE w w E w wτ τ+ +− − − ≈x x
{ } { }
{ } { }
* * *’ 2 *’ 2
, ,
2 2 *’ 2 *’ 2
exp 0.5 exp 0.5
0.5 exp 0.5 exp 0.5
t k t k k t t k t t
k
t t t t t t
x xτ
τ
β β σ σ
σ σ σ σ
+
+
  − + × − + × +   
  × − + × − + ×   
∑  
 
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( ) ( )t t t tE u u E u uτ τ+ +− − − ≈x x
( ) ( )* * *’ *’, ,t k t k k t k t
k
x xτγ γ φ φ+   − −   ∑  
Due to the transformation of the coefficient vectors (described in this Appendix above), one has
* * * *
, , 0 , , , , 01 1
0
lL D
t k k t t l d l d tl d
k
x xβ β β β
= =
=
= + =∑ ∑ ∑ and * * * *, , 0 , , , , 01 1
0
lL D
t k k t t l d l d tl d
k
x xγ γ γ γ
= =
=
= + =∑ ∑ ∑  t∀
where *
, 0tβ  and *, 0tγ  are the transformed coefficients of the constants. Therefore,
( ) ( )t t t tE w w E w wτ τ+ +− − − ≈x x
{ } { }
{ } { }
{ }
* * *’ 2 * * *’ 2
, , , ,
0 0
0
* * *’ 2 *’ 2
, 0 , 0
2 2 *’ 2
exp 0.5 exp 0.5
exp 0.5 exp 0.5
0.5 exp 0.5 ex
t k t k k t t t k t k k t t
k k
t t t t t t
t t t t
x xτ τ
τ
τ
β β σ β β σ
β β σ σ
σ σ σ
+ +
≠ ≠
=
+
+
      − + × − − + × +      
  − + × − + × +   
 × − + × − 
∑ ∑ 
 


{ }*’ 2p 0.5t tσ + × 
( ) ( )t t t tE u u E u uτ τ+ +− − − ≈x x
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* * *’ * * *’
, , , ,
0 0
0
* * *’ * * *’
, 0 , 0 , 0 , 0
t k t k k t t k t k k t
k k
t t t t t t
x xτ τ
τ τ
γ γ φ γ γ φ
γ γ φ γ γ φ
+ +
≠ ≠
=
+ +
   − − − +   
   − − −   
∑ ∑ 
 

If a labour market has characteristic kx , then 1kx =  (due to the dummy variable specification). It
follows that the terms { }* * *’ 2, ,
0
exp 0.5t k t k k t t
k
xτβ β σ+
≠
  − + ×   ∑   and ( )* * *’, ,
0
t k t k k t
k
xτγ γ φ+
≠
 − ∑ 
are always positive if * *
, ,t k t kτβ β+ −   and * *, ,t k t kτγ γ+ −   are positive, respectively. This is the result
I want to show: it means that if * *
, ,t k t kτβ β+ −   is positive, then being in a labour market which has
characteristic kx  raises the expected relative wage change ( ) ( )t t t tE w w E w wτ τ+ + − − − x x
(ceteris paribus). Similarly, if * *
, ,t k t kτγ γ+ −   is positive, then being in a labour market which has
characteristic kx  raises the expected relative unemployment change
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( ) ( )t t t tE u u E u uτ τ+ + − − − x x  (ceteris paribus). Note that this statement only holds for the
changes of the transformed coefficients * *
, ,t k t kτβ β+ −   and * *, ,t k t kτγ γ+ −  . The interpretation of the
changes of the untransformed dummy variable coefficients 
, ,t k t kτβ β+ −   and , ,t k t kτγ γ+ − 
would not be unambiguous. The key issue is that in order to obtain the effect of a variable kx  on
e.g. the relative wage dynamics with respect to a reference market, the kβ  coefficient has to be
transformed in such a way that it states the difference in the expected log-wage between a person
in category kx  and the reference person. In common specifications of dummy variables, the
reference person is in a pre-specified base category. As my reference person is a ‘mean’ x , I have
to transform the dummy variable coefficients such that they state the differences in the expected
values of the log-wage to this mean. This transformation is the one suggested by Haisken-DeNew
and Schmidt (1997).
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B. Graphical Illustration of Equation (1)
Figure A1: A Net Supply Shock and the Trade-Off Between the Wage Rate and
Unemployment
W
D, S
Dt
St+τ
Dt+τ
’
tU τ+
’’
tU τ+
tU
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,t tW t Q tW Qτ τ+ +
≠
 
− Ψ ∆ + Ψ ∆  ∑ ∑X x Xx X X x X X
measure of size of the net supply
(demand) shock
St
there is a trade-off between the wage
rate and unemployment U=f(W)
tW
’’
tW τ+
’
tW τ+
The figure illustrates the concepts of equation (1) in the text. The equation states the relationship
between the change in the unemployment rate due to rigid wages rigid wage rateU  in any labour market
x  and the change in the wage rate in this labour market as well as the changes in the net supply
shift factors:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,t t t tt rigid wage rate W t W t Q t
own wage effect
cross wage effects pure net supply shift effects
net supply shift effects
U W W Qτ τ τ τ+ + + +
≠
∆ ≈ Ψ ∆ + Ψ ∆ + Ψ ∆∑ ∑
X x X
x x x x x X X x X X

 

   (1)
Net supply shift effects can only be observed directly if the wage rate is held constant. This is
illustrated in a thought experiment in Figure A1. The graph displays the labour supply and demand
schedules in a labour market x  at times t  and t τ+ . Between these two points in time, both
schedules shift to the right (one may think of this as a growing economy). However, at a constant
wage rate, the increase in demand is larger than the increase in supply. Hence the net supply
(demand) shift effect is negative (positive) such that unemployment would fall at a constant wage.
For this reason, I term such a labour market an ‘increasing market’ (independent of the actual wage
development). As can also be seen from the graph, any given demand-supply constellation presents
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a trade-off between the wage rate and unemployment. An increase in the wage rate will ceteris
paribus raise unemployment, e.g. to ’tU τ+  or 
’’
tU τ+ . This is formalised by the own wage effect in
equation (1).
C. Relationship to the ‘Wage Curve’ Hypothesis
This appendix shortly discusses how the approach taken in this paper relates to the ‘wage curve’
hypothesis, as this issue has been raised a number of times in seminars. An overview of the wage
curve hypothesis can be found in the book by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) and in the review
article by Card (1995). The wage curve is primarily an empirical phenomenon: regressions of the
logarithm of wages on the logarithm of local unemployment rates and other control variables have
found a coefficient of about –0.1 on the logarithm of the local unemployment rate. This empirical
correlation between local unemployment and wages is termed the ‘wage curve’. A ‘local’
unemployment rate can refer to a region or an industry, but other definitions of local labour
markets are conceivable. Although a number of theories can be proposed for the empirical finding
of a wage curve, I will discuss here how the wage curve relates to my own framework.
As mentioned in Appendix B., there is – in the neoclassical model proposed in this paper – a trade-
off between the wage rate and unemployment for any demand-supply constellation in a labour
market. Figure A2 below shows how this trade-off may be displayed for different demand-supply
constellations (the trade-off need not be linear, of-course) in wage-unemployment space. I draw in
this space, because this is where the wage curve is usually presented (see also Figure A2 for a
presentation of a wage curve). Assume we are in a labour market which rests at an equilibrium
( ),t tW U  and this labour market experiences positive net demand shocks. The results will we
downward shifts in the wage-unemployment trade-off lines. The equilibria that we would observe
corresponding to various shocks depends on where wages settle. It may well be possible that they
settle on the ‘wage curve’ line and, in this case, one would observe the wage curve as a negative
relationship between wages and unemployment. On the other hand, it is conceivable that there are
no net demand shocks, but that the wage setting mechanism varies such that different points on a
wage-unemployment trade-off line are chosen. In this case, one would observe a positive
correlation between wages and unemployment.
As I do not model wage setting in this paper, my model is not incompatible with the existence of a
wage curve (in the sense of a negative statistical correlation between wages and unemployment
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rates). However, I address a different question than the wage curve literature. Blanchflower and
Oswald (1994, p. 6) suggest that the wage curve constitutes a ‘measure of wage inflexibility’. Yet,
from the perspective of the framework I use here, two remarks are important.
First, as Figure A2 illustrates, the change in observed unemployment is not necessarily a measure
of the net demand shock a labour market experienced. Therefore the observed changes in the wage
rate and unemployment do not indicate how wages react to shocks, as shocks cannot be
straightforwardly measured unless the wage rate remains unchanged. In the face of this
endogeneity of unemployment to wage setting, the wage curve can only be a measure of labour
market inflexibility in this framework if further assumptions on the trade-off between the wage rate
and unemployment are invoked (e.g. that the trade-offs are equal across all labour markets).
Second, the wage curve estimates only one parameter which describes the equilibrium locus of
wages and unemployment. The notion is that this parameter is a summary measure of wage
rigidity. I argue that this is not the correct interpretation if labour markets are heterogeneous in
their reaction to shocks. This heterogeneity is the issue of interest in this paper, as illustrated in
Figures A3 and A4. Figure A3 displays the nine (I to IX) different cases of the classification of
wage behaviour and labour markets of Definition 1. The wage curve lies in quadrants III and VII
and goes through point IX (which is the initial equilibrium on the wage curve). As shown in Figure
A4, one may observe a wage curve, although some labour markets are perfectly flexible when
shocked (i.e. they correspond to cases II and VI of Figure A3). These can even be the majority of
labour markets and therefore the wage curve does not necessarily provide a summary measure of
wage inflexibility!
My interest is in finding out which labour markets are flexible and which are rigid between two
points of time t  and t τ+ . I argue that this is an interesting question from a policy perspective: I
want to know where wages are rigid in the economy. As Figure A4 shows, the regression of wages
on unemployment (i.e. the estimation of a wage curve) does not provide an answer to this question.
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Figure A2: Shocks to a Labour Market and Potential Wage-Unemployment Outcomes
W
U
trade-off between the wage rate and
unemployment for a given demand-supply
constellation: U=f(W)
‘wage curve’
‘wage curve’ hypothesis states
that this will be the equilibrium
negative net
demand shock
tW
tU ( )tU W∆
Figure A3: The Difference Between My Approach and the Attempt to Estimate a Wage
Curve
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Note: The figure illustrates the classification of labour markets according to their position in wage
unemployment space at time period t τ+  when the equilibrium in period t  has been ( ),t tW U . The
Roman numbers refer to the following cases: quadrant I (strongly rigid – wage push), line II
(strongly adjusting in an increasing market), quadrant III (weakly adjusting in an increasing
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market), line IV (weakly rigid in an increasing market), quadrant V (strongly converging), line VI
(strongly adjusting in a decreasing market), quadrant VII (weakly adjusting in a decreasing
market), line VIII (weakly rigid in a decreasing market), point IX (stable in a stable market).
Figure A4: Heterogeneity Which the ‘Wage Curve’ Cannot Explain
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Note: The figure illustrates that even if regression analysis identifies a ‘wage curve’, the interesting
question which labour markets are perfectly flexible and which ones not remains unanswered.
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D. Data Appendix
Table A1: Sample Sizes
Equation Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wage 1992 5,517 4,632 4,621 4,446 4,360 4,243 4,206
1998 6,007 5,105 5,087 4,370 4,303 4,120 4,069
Unemployment 1992 9,080 5,788 5,765 5,526 5,398 5,231 5,186
1998 10,480 6,458 6,423 5,374 5,271 5,054 4,983
Notes: Observations not fulfilling the following criteria are successively eliminated from the
sample: (1) number of employed people (wage equation) or people who report a labour force status
(unemployment equation) in the corresponding wave; (2) number of observations with a reported
hourly wage rate (wage equation) or number of people in the labour force (unemployment
equation); (3) age between 16 and 65 years (inclusively); (4) observations are already observed in
any of the three previous waves (to obtain occupation, industry, and sector of employment
variables; see the discussion in Section 4.1); (5) observations report occupation, industry, and
sector of employment; (6) observations do not belong to the categories occupation: manager or
industry: agriculture; (7) observations have no other missings in the variables used for estimation.
Due to the panel nature of the GSOEP, there are common observations in the 1992 and 1998
waves. As a result, the total number of individuals in the wage (unemployment) equations is 5,556
(7,288).
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP); own calculations.
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Table A2: Sample Unemployment Rates
1992 1994 1996 1998
Whole sample 4.396 6.064 6.764 7.024
Age in years
16-25 5.818 12.990 13.350 13.938
26-35 4.812 7.009 6.804 7.332
36-45 3.810 3.967 5.822 6.391
46-55 3.682 3.575 4.524 4.145
56-65 3.676 1.632 3.491 4.464
Education in years
0-8 9.176 8.684 11.957 12.333
9 5.426 9.558 8.459 11.273
10-11 3.563 5.675 5.872 6.575
12-13 5.663 5.423 7.981 6.692
14 2.577 4.433 5.172 4.292
15-20 2.817 3.704 5.311 4.538
Gender
male 3.364 5.909 6.189 6.627
female 5.850 6.277 7.527 7.549
Occupation
professional 1.551 3.581 2.978 2.113
white-collar 1.625 3.790 3.688 4.593
blue-collar 3.034 6.003 5.553 5.843
no previous employment 35.736 29.242 33.703 39.080
Industry
industry 2.514 5.398 4.801 4.957
services 1.978 4.010 3.890 4.336
no previous employment 35.736 29.242 33.703 39.080
Sector of Employment
public sector 1.372 2.258 3.109 2.893
private sector 2.500 5.441 4.682 5.157
no previous employment 35.736 29.242 33.703 39.080
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Table A2: Sample Unemployment Rates (ctd.)
1992 1994 1996 1998
Bundesland
Schleswig-Holstein or
Hamburg
4.641 4.274 6.122 4.206
Niedersachsen or Bremen 5.263 6.491 7.078 7.465
Nordrhein-Westfalen 5.628 7.004 6.983 8.463
Hessen 3.591 5.313 6.872 7.173
Rheinland-Pfalz or
Saarland
3.254 5.740 7.434 5.128
Baden-Württemberg 4.087 6.143 6.436 6.392
Bayern 3.175 5.275 6.375 6.515
Observations 5,186 4,931 5,411 4,983
Note: The occupation, industry, and sector of employment variables are taken from the most
recently available of the corresponding three previous waves. People with no previous employment
conceptually build an extra category for each of these three dummy variable groups. Hence this
variable is reported three times here, although it only appears once in the estimation.
Note that changes in these figures over time are sensitive to changing shares of GSOEP
subsamples. Labour force sample shares of subsamples A (people in households living in western
Germany in 1984), B (foreigners of certain nationalities in western Germany), C (east Germans),
and D (immigrants entering the country 1984-93) are 69.65, 29.93, 0.42, 0.00 per cent in 1992,
69.44, 28.92, 1.64, 0.00 per cent in 1994, 61.98, 23.64, 2.51, 11.86 per cent in 1996, and  64.10,
22.66, 2.73, 10.52 per cent in 1998, respectively. The peak in the sample unemployment rate is in
1998 instead of 1997 (where the peak in the official figures occurs) even if subsample D is
dropped. The empirical analysis controls for the changes in subsample weights by dummy
variables.
Source: GSOEP; own calculations.
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Table A3: Sample Means
Means Wage Regression Means Unemployment
Regression
1992 1998 1992 1998
ln hourly wage rate; or
unemployed, respectively
3.015 3.056 0.044 0.070
Age in years
16-25 0.173 0.116 0.176 0.124
26-35 0.274 0.331 0.272 0.326
36-45 0.255 0.268 0.248 0.267
46-55 0.224 0.197 0.225 0.194
56-65 0.074 0.088 0.079 0.090
Education in years
0-8 0.080 0.054 0.082 0.060
9 0.120 0.088 0.124 0.096
10-11 0.549 0.520 0.541 0.513
12-13 0.115 0.159 0.119 0.156
14 0.039 0.047 0.037 0.047
15-20 0.099 0.132 0.096 0.128
Gender
male 0.594 0.578 0.585 0.569
female 0.406 0.422 0.415 0.431
Occupation
professional 0.144 0.183 0.137 0.171
white-collar 0.387 0.412 0.380 0.402
blue-collar 0.431 0.367 0.419 0.357
no previous employment 0.038 0.038 0.064 0.070
Industry
industry 0.488 0.438 0.468 0.421
services 0.474 0.523 0.468 0.509
no previous employment 0.038 0.038 0.064 0.070
Sector of Employment
public sector 0.227 0.240 0.211 0.222
private sector 0.735 0.722 0.725 0.708
no previous employment 0.038 0.038 0.064 0.070
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Table A3: Sample Means (ctd.)
Means Wage Regression Means Unemployment
Regression
1992 1998 1992 1998
Bundesland
Schleswig-Holstein or
Hamburg
0.046 0.044 0.046 0.043
Niedersachsen or Bremen 0.107 0.130 0.106 0.129
Nordrhein-Westfalen 0.274 0.276 0.281 0.285
Hessen 0.111 0.098 0.107 0.095
Rheinland-Pfalz or
Saarland
0.067 0.079 0.065 0.078
Baden-Württemberg 0.209 0.188 0.212 0.185
Bayern 0.186 0.186 0.182 0.185
Observations 4,206 4,069 5,186 4,983
Notes: The hourly wage rate is measured in 1998 Deutsche Marks. 1992 wages are adjusted by the
consumer price index for western Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2000).
The occupation, industry, and sector of employment variables are taken from the most recently
available of the corresponding three previous waves. People with no previous employment
conceptually build an extra category for each of these three dummy variable groups. Hence this
variable is reported three times here, although it only appears once in the estimation.
Labour force sample shares of subsamples A (people in households living in western Germany in
1984), B (foreigners of certain nationalities in western Germany), C (east Germans), and D
(immigrants entering the country 1984-93) are 69.65, 29.93, 0.42, 0.00 per cent in 1992 and 64.10,
22.66, 2.73, 10.52 per cent in 1998, respectively. The empirical analysis controls for the changes in
subsample weights by dummy variables.
Due to the panel nature of the GSOEP, there are common observations in the 1992 and 1998
waves. As a result, the total number of individuals in the wage (unemployment) equations is 5,556
(7,288).
Source: GSOEP; own calculations.
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Table A4: Wage and Unemployment Structures 1992
Wage Regression Unemployment Regression
*
ˆ
t
t -value *ˆ t t -value
1992 Sample Mean 3.007** 337.74 -2.061** -39.11
Age in years
16-25 -0.362** -17.61 -0.174** -2.26
26-35 0.003 0.29 0.142** 2.48
36-45 0.089** 8.44 -0.031 -0.47
46-55 0.128** 10.93 0.010 0.14
56-65 0.142** 6.29 -0.033 -0.25
Education in years
0-8 -0.071** -2.71 0.213** 2.07
9 -0.228** -8.51 0.035 0.38
10-11 0.004 0.55 -0.013 -0.38
12-13 -0.015 -0.71 0.022 0.24
14 0.116** 3.61 -0.104 -0.49
15-20 0.285** 11.34 -0.139 -0.97
Gender
male 0.090** 14.16 -0.091** -2.77
female -0.132** -14.16 0.127** 2.77
Occupation
professional 0.132** 6.27 -0.148 -1.12
white-collar 0.032** 2.68 -0.321** -4.53
blue-collar -0.024** -1.96 0.062 0.97
no previous employment -0.558** -9.79 1.810** 11.67
Industry
industry 0.093** 8.02 -0.227** -3.62
services -0.047** -4.22 -0.011 -0.20
no previous employment -0.598** -10.34 1.732** 10.47
Sector of Employment
public sector 0.071** 4.49 -0.286** -2.84
private sector 0.010** 1.96 -0.065** -2.06
no previous employment -0.620** -10.71 1.673** 10.11
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Table A4: Wage and Unemployment Structures 1992 (ctd.)
Wage Regression Unemployment Regression
*
ˆ
t
t -value *ˆ t t -value
Bundesland
Schleswig-Holstein or
Hamburg
0.003 0.13 0.132 0.84
Niedersachsen or Bremen -0.047** -2.29 0.211** 2.15
Nordrhein-Westfalen -0.017 -1.62 0.062 1.12
Hessen 0.028 1.45 -0.088 -0.80
Rheinland-Pfalz or
Saarland
-0.037 -1.62 -0.165 -1.07
Baden-Württemberg 0.022 1.60 -0.022 -0.32
Bayern 0.024** 1.85 -0.116 -1.40
Notes: Coefficients marked with two (one) asterisk(s) are significant at the 5 (10) per cent level.
The occupation, industry, and sector of employment variables are taken from the corresponding
three previous waves. People with no previous employment conceptually build an extra category
for each of these three dummy variable groups. As a consequence, this variable appears in each
group of the occupation, industry, and sector of employment variables for the transformation of the
coefficients as described in Appendix A., although it only appears once in the estimation. As
mentioned in the text and Appendix A., the reference person is the 1992 Sample Mean tx  also for
the year 1998.
Source: GSOEP; own calculations.
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Table A5: Wage and Unemployment Structures 1998
Wage Regression Unemployment Regression
*
ˆ
t τ+
t -value *ˆ t τ+ t -value
1992 Sample Mean 3.049** 305.26 -1.718** -39.31
Age in years
16-25 -0.335** -10.87 0.153** 2.33
26-35 -0.005 -0.37 0.049 1.07
36-45 0.105** 8.93 0.024 0.47
46-55 0.107** 9.02 -0.155** -2.34
56-65 0.120** 6.05 -0.146 -1.34
Education in years
0-8 -0.092** -3.13 0.167* 1.65
9 -0.236** -9.40 0.141** 1.80
10-11 0.009 1.28 -0.011 -0.38
12-13 0.015 0.82 -0.119 -1.56
14 0.158** 4.88 -0.139 -0.91
15-20 0.233** 9.58 -0.061 -0.59
Gender
male 0.093** 14.33 -0.012 -0.43
female -0.137** -14.33 0.017 0.43
Occupation
professional 0.185** 9.05 -0.352** -3.35
white-collar 0.009 0.77 -0.123** -2.30
blue-collar -0.031** -2.66 0.005 0.09
no previous employment -0.443** -7.09 1.444** 11.67
Industry
industry 0.075** 6.73 -0.184** -3.77
services -0.033** -3.02 -0.037 -0.85
no previous employment -0.553** -8.60 1.613** 11.67
Sector of Employment
public sector 0.073** 4.65 -0.262** -3.46
private sector 0.006 1.15 -0.060** -2.54
no previous employment -0.555** -8.63 1.535** 11.23
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Table A5: Wage and Unemployment Structures 1998 (ctd.)
Wage Regression Unemployment Regression
*
ˆ
t τ+
t -value *ˆ t τ+ t -value
Bundesland
Schleswig-Holstein or
Hamburg
-0.009 -0.30 -0.206 -1.24
Niedersachsen or Bremen -0.036** -1.98 0.052 0.67
Nordrhein-Westfalen -0.012 -1.11 0.166** 3.61
Hessen 0.012 0.60 -0.043 -0.47
Rheinland-Pfalz or
Saarland
-0.038* -1.65 -0.180 -1.60
Baden-Württemberg 0.021 1.48 -0.104 -1.63
Bayern 0.023* 1.72 -0.024 -0.38
Notes: Coefficients marked with two (one) asterisk(s) are significant at the 5 (10) per cent level.
The occupation, industry, and sector of employment variables are taken from the most recently
available of the most recently available of the corresponding three previous waves. People with no
previous employment conceptually build an extra category for each of these three dummy variable
groups. As a consequence, this variable appears in each group of the occupation, industry, and
sector of employment variables for the transformation of the coefficients as described in Appendix
A., although it only appears once in the estimation. As mentioned in the text and Appendix A., the
reference person is the 1992 Sample Mean tx  also for the year 1998.
Source: GSOEP; own calculations.
